

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON ☐

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

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March 16, 1973


MEMORANDUM FOR

Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Director of Central Intelligence

I found your proposals to combat Arab terrorism stimulating, and I encourage you to pursue them. Their cumulative effect, coupled with what others are doing, could help to achieve the desired results.

I encourage you to implement those operations for which you feel you already have sufficient policy approval, and to pursue Cabinet Committee on Terrorism or 40 Committee action, as appropriate, on the remainder.

Please keep me informed of significant achievements.


Henry A. Kissinger

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XGDS: Dr. Kissinger
March 9, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NND 10-13/3200 per Sec 3.3(a)(1)(6); 3.5(c) Hr. 9/11/2013
By RS/MH NARA, Date 10/6/2016

[1 of 17]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY
SUBJECT: Response to Arab Terrorism

What happened
at Cabinet
Committee for
Terrorism

Jim Schlesinger forwards ideas on what we might do to combat Arab terrorism. (A paper on what to do about Qadhafi in Libya follows.)

He makes specific proposals for domestic action, "big power" or bilateral collaboration, and present and possible CIA unilateral action. The aim is to discredit the terrorists, destroy their morale and effectiveness, and preserve an atmosphere for peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab dispute.

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None of these proposals promises a dramatic solution to the problem of Arab terrorism, but together they offer a substantial attack against such terrorism at little risk.

Some of these operations are in motion; others the CIA can implement immediately. There are some which Schlesinger proposes to pursue via the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism or the 40 Committee and he notes that your endorsement would accelerate action by these groups.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Mr. Schlesinger (TAB A) giving your general endorsement to Schlesinger's proposals, and encouraging him to implement those for which his Agency has policy approval, and to solicit Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, 40 Committee or such other approvals as may be necessary to implement others.

Attachments:

TABS A and B

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Tab B

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs


SUBJECT: A Response to Arab Terrorism

Attached is a paper developed by John Waller, Larry Devlin and Jim Angleton and their people on what we might do about Arab terrorism. A separate paper will follow on what might be done particularly with respect to Qadhafi in Libya, who is proving to be one of the major sponsors of this activity. If these ideas ring a bell with you, we would prosecute some through the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism and others of course through the 40 Committee as appropriate, but both would be accelerated by your endorsement.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. R. Schlesinger".

James R. Schlesinger
Director

Attachment



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~~SECRET~~A RESPONSE TO ARAB TERRORISM

Basic objectives of the United States toward the Palestinian terrorist movement should be:

- A. To identify the leaders of this movement as unprincipled and irresponsible criminals and outlaws, and to deprive them of all plausible claim to legitimacy as representatives of the Palestinian people.
- B. To stimulate opposition to this movement on the part of governments, public opinion makers, and populations, particularly in the Arab world.
- C. To destroy the morale, organizational cohesion, and operational effectiveness of the terrorist movement.
- D. To prevent its actions from damaging United States relations with the Arab governments and destroying an atmosphere in which a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute may be possible.

These objectives can best be accomplished through cooperative and collaborative actions by all governments which in varying ways and in varying degrees stand to be hurt by terrorist activities. Such collaboration should take place both on the diplomatic level and, where liaisons exist, on the level of security services.

Because innocent people of any country can be harmed in a terrorist action, whether it be along the lines of the Khartoum incident, an aircraft hijacking or demolition, or wanton terrorism on the street, there does exist common cause. This must be appealed to now when the horror of Khartoum is still fresh in mind.

Everything possible must be done to make the cost of a terrorist act as high as possible to would-be perpetrators of terrorism. So long as effective deterrents do not exist,

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terrorism will prosper. Fear of punishment and retaliation should be instilled in the terrorist movement, and their failures publicized. This outside pressure should be supplemented

[REDACTED]

Arab terrorism is one product of the ever-festering Arab-Israeli dispute. It is a tempting tactic and one all too commonly applauded by Arabs. Until this conflict is somehow resolved, however, it should be our objective to show that terrorism, however gratifying as a vent for frustration, lessens the likelihood of a Middle Eastern solution, harms the Arab image in the world, and lessens the chances of a solution favorable to the Arabs.

Given below are suggestions for specific action to meet and mitigate the Arab terrorist problem.


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

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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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