

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Initiative in Jarring
Peace Talks

The Israeli Government has given Ambassador Jarring documents entitled "Essentials of Peace" setting forth Israel's views on the conditions of peace with the UAR, Jordan and Lebanon. The initiative to provide substantive Israeli positions to the Arab Governments through Jarring, as we had urged Israel to do, came from Prime Minister Meir personally in intensive discussions with Jarring in Jerusalem January 8-9. Copies of the three documents are at TAB A.

The Israeli documents cover all principal aspects of an Arab-Israel settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. They concentrate particularly on the obligations of peace but also contain formulations on territory and boundaries, withdrawal, security arrangements, and refugees which, while far short of what the Arabs seek, do not close any doors.

In presenting the documents to Jarring, Mrs. Meir made clear that Israel saw as his first order of business to test whether the UAR seriously contemplated peace with Israel. Jarring initially urged Israel to make a more forthcoming statement on withdrawal but after further discussion agreed to put the documents to the Arabs. He conveyed the text to UAR Ambassador Zayyat late January 11, stressing that most of the points in the document are already within UAR policy and urging an affirmative response. He did the same with Jordanian Ambassador al-Farra January 11.

Our view, which Jarring indicates that he shares, is that the Israeli documents represent a serious beginning

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to substantive negotiations. It is significant that they avoid raising procedural obstacles which have so often blocked progress in the past and are concentrated instead on opening substantive proposals to be conveyed to the Arab side. Through low-key approaches to the British, French, and Russians and to the Arabs themselves, we are doing what we can to urge the Arabs, and the UAR in particular, to respond in a nonpolemic, substantive manner so that genuine negotiations can get under way. We hope that the Arabs will respond with their own substantive points, seeking clarification on specific elements of the Israeli documents, and pursuing further exchanges on unsatisfactory points in accordance with the normal negotiating process.

The UAR, whose position at this point is key, has meanwhile been engaged in an intensive diplomatic and public campaign, the thrust of which is that (a) it cannot extend the ceasefire beyond the present February 5 deadline unless there is substantial progress toward a settlement and agreement on Israeli withdrawal, (b) the Four Powers must therefore now provide Jarring with detailed guidelines for "implementation" of Resolution 242, and (c) in the absence of such guidelines, it will request a Security Council meeting in late January.

There is considerable doubt in our minds whether the UAR, even in light of the unexpectedly substantive Israeli proposals, can now shift from the Four Power-Security Council route, which it sees as a means of pressuring us to pressure Israel, to the negotiating forum under Jarring. If it moves to the Security Council, it casts serious doubt as to UAR desire to negotiate seriously. In our diplomatic contacts, we are stressing that a Security Council meeting or premature Four Power intervention (a) would be a major setback to the beginning which has been made, (b) would undermine our ability to play a constructive role with Israel, and (c) could be seized upon by the Israelis to disengage from the Jarring negotiating process they have at last entered upon. At the same time, we are indicating that, if the Egyptians respond seriously in the Jarring channel to the Israeli

proposals, this will open up the possibility not only for an extension of the ceasefire but also for the Four Powers to begin considering the question of guarantees and peacekeeping arrangements, to which the other three powers and the Egyptians say they attach great importance.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

TAB A - Texts of Israeli Proposals

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TEXT OF ISRAEL-JORDAN DOCUMENT GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR JARRING BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

Essentials of Peace

- A. The central purpose of the discussions between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel is the establishment of peace between them. All the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 242 are within the context of the establishment of the just and durable peace which is the paramount aim of this resolution.
- B. Israel regards peace with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a concept embracing good neighborly relations and cooperation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. But whether or not peace receives its full expression in the immediate future, there are certain indispensable essentials without which a situation cannot be regarded as a situation of peace. Peace involves amongst other things:
- 1. The declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict as finally terminated.
- 2. Respect and acknowledgment by the parties in explicit terms of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
- 3. Establishment of secure, recognized and agreed boundaries.
 - 4. Other additional arrangements for ensuring security.
- 5. Withdrawal of military forces from territories lying beyond positions agreed in the peace treaty.
- 6. The termination of all states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency.
- 7. The responsibility for ensuring that no warlike act, or violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in its territory against the population, citizens or property of the other party.

- 8. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations including boycott. Support for the principle of the freedom of navigation and termination of discriminations or interferences. This obligation is not dependent on anything except the conclusion of the state of war.
- 9. Formulation with high priority of provisions laying down the obligations accepted by the parties towards the settlement of the refugee problem, after which neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.
- 10. Arrangements concerning places of religious and historical significance.
 - 11. Arrangements for a free port and transit facilities.
- 12. Non-participation in hostile alliances and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the other.
- 13. Non-interference in domestic affairs and non-interference in the normal foreign relations of the other party.
- 14. Peace must be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal law and precedent.

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