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WON 13
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 3107
INFO RUQMV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3986
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 1372
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1971 MARCH 3
8:36 A.M.

BT

S E C R E T AMMAN 1127

NODIS/CEDAR

SUBJECT: JORDAN'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE

1. AT A TIME WHEN - QUITE PROPERLY - MOST PARTIES ARE CONCENTRATING ON EFFORTS TO FURTHER A PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON JORDAN'S EVENTUAL ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT.
2. MY BELIEF IS THAT ON THE ARAB SIDE THE INITIATIVES MUST BE TAKEN AND THE PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE EGYPTIANS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALTHOUGH HUSSEIN CANNOT LEAD, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE CLOSELY FOLLOW UP ANY TRAIL BLAZED BY THE UAR. I FEEL ALSO THAT OUR PEACE EFFORTS CAN BECOME INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE IF ONE ARAB NEGOTIATING PARTNER SEEMS TO BE DRAWING FAR AHEAD OF THE OTHER.
3. WE ALREADY HAVE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH THE GOJ AND MANY PALESTINIANS ARE APPREHENSIVE LEST THE UAR - PROMPTED BY COMPELLING NATIONAL INTERESTS - MIGHT SEEK TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE OR PARTIAL PEACE WITH ISRAEL. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN, OR SEEMED TO BE HAPPENING, WE COULD EXPECT A STRONG ANTI-EGYPTIAN REACTION THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. NOT ONLY PALESTINIANS BUT OTHER ARABS (ESPECIALLY THE RADICALS) WOULD PROTEST THE DEFECTION OF A STATE WHICH ONLY RECENTLY HOSTED THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS. EGYPT WOULD FACE CRITICISM ALSO FROM TRADITIONAL MUSLIM CIRCLES (ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA) OVER JERUSALEM'S OMISSION FROM A SETTLEMENT. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT SUCH FOREIGN CRITICISM OF THE UAR'S POLICY MIGHT BE EXPLOITED WITH TROUBLESOME EFFECT BY THOSE DOMESTIC FORCES IN EGYPT THAT OPPOSE SADAT AND THE VERY IDEA OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

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4. ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, MOREOVER, THE MORE PROGRESS WE ACHIEVE ON UAR-ISRAELI QUESTIONS, THE LESS AMENABLE ISRAEL MAY PROVE TO BE ON CONCESSIONS INVOLVING JORDAN. ISRAEL MAY BELIEVE THAT IF, IN ANSWER TO OUR CONCERN, SHE MODIFIES HER STAND TOWARD THE UAR, SHE COULD THEN MORE EASILY SIT TIGHT REGARDING THE ISSUES ON HER EASTERN FRONT. TO ISRAEL, SUCH A CONCESSION MIGHT SEEM THE MORE PLAUSIBLE SINCE IT IS THE UAR-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION (WITH ITS US-USSR OVERTONES) THAT ENGENDERS THE GREATEST DEGREE OF AMERICAN SECURITY CONCERN. ISRAEL MIGHT HOPE WE WOULD JUST AS SOON AVOID A SEPARATE DIPLOMATIC SHOWDOWN OVER JORDAN - ESPECIALLY SINCE THE CRUNCH HERE WOULD CONCERN A US CLIENT AND NOT INVOLVE A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

5. I DO NOT URGE THAT PROGRESS ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT NEEDS AT EACH POINT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY PRECISELY CORRESPONDING PROGRESS UPON THE JORDANIAN ONE. BUT I URGE THAT PROGRESS ON BOTH FRONTS BE COORDINATED ON THE BASIS THAT A STABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD ANSWER THE NEEDS OF JORDAN, AS WELL AS ISRAEL AND THE UAR.

6. SPECIFICALLY I WOULD RECOMMEND KEEPING THE JORDANIANS AS CLOSELY ADVISED AS WE CAN ON ANY PROGRESS BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL. THIS COULD BE DONE IN WASHINGTON (AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT AT USUN), AS WELL AS AMMAN. IT WOULD BE GOOD ALSO IF AMB. JARRING PROCEEDED TO EXPLORE THE POSITIONS OF ISRAEL AND JORDAN AS SOON AS WAS CONVENIENT. IF NOT, THE LACK OF PARALLEL GOJ-UAR PROGRESS COULD STIMULATE AREA OBJECTIONS TO EGYPT'S PEACE MOVES AND MAKE IT HARDER TO ELICIT SOME VENTUAL COMPROMISE FROM THE GOI OVER JERUSALEM, THE WEST BANK AND THE REFUGEES. GP-3

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