## ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506

January 20, 1970

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report on Selected Activities in the Executive Office of the President

This Council's study of the President's Office has included in its second phase a study of selected activities within the Executive Office of the President. These are:

- A. Science Advisory Activities
- B. National Aeronautics and Space Council
- C. Special Assistant for Youth Affairs and President's Council on Youth Opportunity
- D. Office of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs and President's Committee on Consumer Interests

We have deferred at this time our recommendations on the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, Office of Economic Opportunity and the Office of Emergency Preparedness. These activities are related to other Council studies and will be covered as appropriate in subsequent reports. Our recommendations on the Marine Council on Science and Engineering have been submitted to you in the Council's Memorandum of January 16, 1970, concerning Oceanographic and Atmospheric Programs Organization.

Underlying our analysis is a fundamental reluctance to increase the number of organizational units reporting to the President. Attaching an activity to the Executive Office of the President (EOP) for the purpose of political emphasis may

well underline its importance and increase its effectiveness by investing it with a claim on the President's time and attention. That positioning, however, must be at the expense of his total effectiveness. From the standpoint of organizational effectiveness, functions which do not demand the President's direct involvement, or which should not be resolved in the last resort by anyone other than him, do not belong in the EOP.

The Council does not expect to make recommendations regarding the National Security Council and the Council of Economic Advisors. We have taken these activities into account, however, to insure consistency with our basic recommendations on the EOP.

We have asked three basic questions about each activity considered:

- -- What specific purpose does the activity serve?
- Does the activity belong within the Executive Office of the President?
- -- If the activity belongs in the EOP, what should be the reporting relationships to the OEM, DPC, and other elements of the Executive Office and the Executive Branch?

Recommendations for reorganization are as follows:

- A. Science Advisory Activities is a term used to encompass four major activities:
  - (1) The President's Advisor on Science and Technology
  - (2) The Office of Science and Technology (OST)
  - (3) The President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC)
  - (4) The Federal Council on Science and Technology (FCST)

National concern during the period immediately following the launching of Sputnik necessitated frequent contact between the Science Advisor and the President. Former Science Advisor Kistiakowski estimated that 50% of his time was spent working on direct assignments from the President. His successor, Jerome Weisner, judged that 30% of his time was spent in this capacity. During the Hornig era, this figure dropped to 10%. Today, about five to ten percent of the Science Advisor's time is so spent. It is clear that the role of the Science Advisor as a direct advisor to the President has diminished.

In the aftermath of Sputnik, PSAC was established to provide the President institutional access to the Nation's top scientific talent. Throughout the late fifties and early sixties, PSAC served effectively as the Science Advisor's staff arm and was vitally involved in shaping high level policy in technical areas. In recent years, PSAC has played a less influential role. OST and BOB professionals consistently express the view that PSAC activities are poorly coupled to the relevant concerns of the White House staff and BOB. Like the Science Advisor, PSAC has had a diminished impact on Presidential level policy decisions.

PSAC is potentially an important link between the Presidential decision process and the Nation's best scientific talent. As an entity it accommodates an important dilemma inherent in Federal efforts to draw upon the scientific establishment. The Nation's leading scientists maintain standing within their community through activities related to the laboratory. Permanent appointments to non-research positions (such as to the professional staff of OST) are generally less valued by the profession. PSAC permits a scientist to serve the Nation on a part-time basis while retaining standing in the scientific community.

PSAC derives 10% of its assignments from specific White House requests and 35% at the request of the Science Advisor; the remaining 55% are self initiated.

Concurrent with the changes in the role of the Science Advisor and PSAC, the Federal Council on Science and Technology (a coordinating activity) and the OST staff have encountered increasing workloads. Currently, 35% of OST staff time is spent on rapid resonse, short term problems such as preparing emergency plans for the Santa Barbara oil spill, supporting feasibility analysis of the SST, or drafting a contingency assessment of the Amchitka nuclear tests.

About 55% of staff time is spent on routine activities involving technical analysis for the BOB, attendance at budget review sessions, committee meetings, technical conferences with agencies, and so forth. Considerable staff time is invested in preparing Congressional testimony for the Science Advisor's increasingly frequent appearances before Congress (66 times in the past five years). OST has been increasingly drawn upon to answer Executive correspondence, about 2000 letters per week, including Congressional and Presidential mail.

The remaining 10% of staff time is devoted to OST initiated projects such as planning studies to permit early identification of technological trends.

The Federal Council for Science and Technology is charged with coordinating interagency science activities. Its charter stems from the National Science Foundation Act. Ineffective in the National Science Foundation, the Council was transferred to OST, where it links 300 officials and 42 executive agencies.

FCST has three functions: (a) to reduce duplication; (b) to devise consistent policies among agencies; (c) to disseminate information. The FCST has had difficulty in meeting the first two of these responsibilities. Its inability to reduce overlap stems fundamentally from its lack of power. It is not an adjudicating body; it has no mechanism to deal with dissent. The FCST may secure agreement from the agencies to participate in a joint program, but at the end of the appropriations process, it is unlikely that all will get all they want. At this point, differing priorities are established, with some agencies retaining the joint program and others abandoning their part in favor of more important budget needs. These limitations also constrain the FCST from establishing consistent interagency policies.

FCST has been somewhat more successful in performing its third function——dissemination of information. Periodic Council meetings provide agency representatives with an opportunity to

learn about the projects of other agencies. The formality of the meetings, however, tend to make it more a forum than a working body, and information is often exchanged after projects are well under way.

In summary, FCST is not highly effective. Yet it consumes one fifth of the entire Science Advisory activities budget and is a major user of OST staff time. FCST's accomplishments do not seem to be commensurate with the drain it places on the Science Advisor's resources.

The Council has restricted this study to questions concerning the Science Advisory activities now within the EOP. Several eminent members of the science community contacted during this study emphasized the need for an additional entity, such as a Council of Science Advisors, to formulate policy and establish priorities for federal science expenditures. We suggest that this would be an appropriate issue for the Domestic Policy Council.

RECOMMENDATION: The President's requests for science advice, though important, are infrequent. In contrast, the White House staff and BOB often seek quick response technical analysis on specific issues, such as the Amchitka nuclear tests or the oil spills. The Science Advisor and his staff should meet both requirements. Appropriate response to the President's direct needs requires an advisor with standing in the scientific community and credibility with the public. But the infrequent demands on this role should permit the Science Advisor to devote much of his time to discerning forthcoming issues of technical content and the implications of new technologies.

The Science Advisor, his staff, and PSAC should work directly with the Office of Executive Management, the Domestic Policy Council, and the National Security Council, providing technical evaluations related to specific high level problems. The OST staff devoted to routine administrative and coordinative tasks should be sharply reduced in size by delegating these activities to the agencies or NSF. The composition of OST staff should be adjusted to increase the number of professionals with standing in the scientific community. These individuals should be recruited from the private sector on a two year contract. Efforts should be made to recruit professionals whose specialties coincide with technical areas of current priority.

The Federal Council on Science and Technology should be sharply reduced. FCST meetings could be held as needs dictate. The major responsibility for information exchange should be assigned to three or four members of the OST staff who should serve as full time liaison representatives. These individuals should establish relationships with scientific project officials in the agencies. They should work between agencies to keep them apprised of related technical projects and research. These individuals can serve as a valuable information resource to the Science Advisor and the BOB. This arrangement will permit more effective and timely information exchange than is possible through formal FCST meetings.

B. The National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) was created by statute under the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The Council is charged with policy planning and operational coordination of military and civilian space programs. Review of the Council's activities suggests that in both areas it has played a small and diminishing role: OST and BOB have effectively subsumed its relevant functions. The Council includes the Vice President as Chairman, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Administrator of NASA, and the Chairman of AEC. Ambiguities in its charter and overlap of the Council's functions with other agencies have seriously detracted from its effectiveness.

The Council held two meetings in 1968 and one in 1969. With few exceptions, lower level representatives rather than agency heads have attended these meetings. The Council has been without an Executive Secretary for over half of its statutory life.

The NAS Council has not played a major role in policy planning. BOB examiners report that it has served primarily as a promotional body and as a lightning rod for space enthusiasts. High level policy decisions seldom involve the Council. Instead, the heads of State, DOD, NASA, and AEC deal directly with the President and key White House staff. Typically, these policy decisions are not of a continuing nature but occur at random intervals as a result of Congressional and budgetary pressures or international developments. These decisions draw on the Council members as individuals but virtually never draw upon the Council as a body. The Council's function as a policy making body appears to be redundant.

Coordination of space related operations is the second activity of the Council. To a large extent, this role too has been subsumed by larger and better staffed activities in the agencies. The Aeronautic and Astronautics Coordinating Board brings members of NASA and DOD into direct contact on operational problems of joint interest. This Board includes study panels which staff out joint problems in depth. In addition, the Federal Council on Science and Technology provides broad gauge interagency coordination. While these bodies suffer from the limitations of all such interagency coordinating activities, they collectively duplicate and exceed the capacity provided by the NAS Council.

RECOMMENDATION: This study has not identified a real need for NASC. It is recommended that NASC be abolished. Since outright dissolution would require amendment of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, steps should be taken at once to reduce the Council to an Executive Director and a few professionals. At this level, the NASC staff might usefully serve as space consultants to OST, PSAC, or the DPC and OEM.

C. Youth Affairs are the responsibility of two units within the EOP: The Office of the Special Assistant for Youth Affairs and the President's Council on Youth Opportunity (PCOYO).

The Special Assistant is formally charged with considering national issues of importance to youth (e.g., drug use, draft laws, youth organizations) and polling youth opinion. In the past months, these functions have been carried out elsewhere in the White House.

There is considerable question as to the substantive values of dealing with critical social, political and economic issues along the dimension of "youth." Young people, like the middle aged and elderly, represent a heterogeneous segment of the society, covering diverse economic and ethnic groups of differing ideological persuasions. It may be more useful to look at specific social problems first and deal with parameters such as age and sex as secondary dimensions. Even issues such as draft reform, while seemingly a "youth problem," cannot be resolved by simply looking at "what youth wants." Draft reform must, of course, take the views of the Nation's youth seriously into account, but together with other considerations such as projected manpower needs, responsiveness to rapid mobilization, and so forth.

The President's Council on Youth Opportunity is assigned the broad mission of coordination and evaluation of Federal youth opportunity programs. Its initial purpose was to provide disadvantaged urban youth with useful summer activities. Members of the Council include the Secretaries of nine agencies, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and the Director of OEO. The Vice President serves as Chairman of the Council and Special Assistant to the President for Youth Affairs as Vice Chairman. It should be noted that the Council has met only eight times in its two and a half year existence. Cabinet members rarely attend these meetings.

PCOYO activities include: (a) recommendations to improve federally-funded summer youth programs; (b) aid in establishing Youth Coordinators in 50 major cities; (c) arrangement for new Federal agency youth programs (such as use of military installations and National Guard units); and (d) arrangements for

services such as transportation, food, and health care for youth participating in summer programs. In addition, PCOYO advises HUD, OEO, and Commerce in allocating \$1.5 million in grants to 50 cities to plan and coordinate local youth programs.

RECOMMENDATION: There is little evidence to suggest that either the Office of the Special Assistant for Youth Affairs or the PCOYO serve a meaningful substantive function. Abolishing both offices is recommended. Policy level functions involving youth, appropriate for the EOP, should be absorbed under the DPC. Experimental functions could be absorbed by the OEO.

The Office of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs currently augments the BOB in advising the President on consumer legislation before Congress. The Office works closely with the Committee on Consumer Interests; both serve in a limited capacity as ombudsmen for the consumer, providing liaison with state consumer agencies and private business, and publicizing consumer issues through public appearances and newsletters. Historical review of the consumer protection movement suggests that this issue does not lend itself to a single remedy. Appeals on behalf of the "consumer interest," when distilled of their zeal, embody a collection of causes, many of interest only to limited constituencies. While "consumerism" has general public appeal, the laws that prescribe remedies do not. Legislation must be written issue by issue. In the legislative process, only that segment of consumers directly concerned with a given issue remain to urge Congress into action against interests that are well formed, purposeful, and effective. There are now four major bills before Congress, all proposing enlarged representation of consumer interests.

RECOMMENDATION: The Council has no organizational recommendations to make on Consumer Affairs which would alter the current Administration position.

On behalf of the Council,

Respectfully submitted,

Roy I Ash

Roy L. Ash Chairman

cc:

Dr. Baker

Gov. Connally

Mr. Kappel

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## EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT LIST OF ACTIVITIES AND FUNDING (1969)

	1/ TOTAL STAFF	BUDGET
Science Advisory Activities	62	1,980,000
National Aeronautics & Space Council	18	500,000
President's Council on Youth Opportunity	5	357,000
Office for Special Assistant for Youth	7	150,000
Office of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs (President's Committee on Consumer	39	421,000
Interests)		

<sup>1/</sup> Staff figures exclude personnel detailed from other agencies