

Chris DeMuth: My name is Chris DeMuth. I'm a DC Searle Senior Fellow here at the American Enterprise Institute, and I am delighted to welcome you here this afternoon for this symposium on Moynihan in the White House. This symposium is sponsored not by AEI. We're happy to be hosting it, but the sponsoring organizations are the Richard Nixon Foundation and the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. It is one of a series of Nixon legacy forums in which these organizations are gathering some old lions from the Nixon administration to reminisce, recollect, reflect on their experiences in the Nixon administration.

A few introductions. These are going to be very brief. There are complete biographies at everybody's place. But I want to say that the Nixon Library and the Nixon Foundation always have a moderator who is, from the outside, a "disinterested expert" who will try to keep everything on the up and up and to try to keep it from descending too far into war stories and hagiography. And we're really delighted that for today's session, we've been able to get Steve Weissman to come over from the Peterson Institute to moderate our forum.

A distinguished journalist, correspondent, bureau chief, senior writer for the "New York Times" for many decades, he has just come out with a book that's been getting a great deal of attention, "Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary". Now, today is a Moynihan fest, not a Weissman fest, but I want to say this is a sensational book, and we have a copy for everybody here to purchase as soon as the session is over in the anteroom. Please, please, please stop by. We're eager to help Steve with the merchandising part of this wonderful project of his.

Before that, we're going to hear two initial words. Geoffrey Shepard, my old friend from White House days who was a White House fellow in 1969 and went on to be associate director of the Domestic Council all the way through 1974, will make remarks on behalf of the Nixon Foundation. But before that, it is a particular honor that we would have with us today, speaking for the Nixon Presidential Library, David Ferrero, who is the archivist of the United States. He was for many decades with the MIT libraries. He was the university librarian of Duke University and director of the New York Public Libraries before his appointment by President Obama and his confirmation just a year ago. And he's the kind of person who, when they come into public service, you think that there is real hope for our government, that we can attract people of such distinction. I'm going to call on Mr. Ferrero to make initial remarks. We'll then hear from Geoff, who will turn things over to David Weissman. Mr. Ferrero, please.

David Ferrero: Thank you, Chris. I'm very pleased to be here today to welcome you to our program about Daniel Patrick Moynihan's tenure in the Nixon White House. Senator Moynihan and the National Archives had a very special

relationship. At one point he lived across Pennsylvania Avenue from our main building and was known to call one of my predecessors about cleaning the pigeon poop off the heads of the statues of the future and the past in front of the building. And for decades, he was the driving force behind the creation of the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation and its work to revitalize that stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue between the Capitol and the White House. The result is what I see out my window every day, a magnificent avenue lined with stately government buildings, museums, restaurants, apartments, embassies, and commercial establishments. There's nothing else quite like it in the country.

Senator Moynihan was a champion of openness in government and some years ago authored a bill that suggested creation of a national declassification center. That center was finally created about a year ago within the National Archives. And it is up and running, charged with the task of reviewing more than 400 million pages of classified records with the intent of making more of our nation's history accessible to the public. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's career of public service stretched for nearly half a century, and throughout that period, he was a source of provocative and controversial ideas as well as insightful and workable solutions to the nation's problems. He served in the administration of four presidents. He was Assistant Secretary of Labor under Presidents Johnson and Kennedy and a Counselor on Urban Affairs and Ambassador to India for President Nixon. President Ford then sent him to the United Nations as our ambassador. In 1976, he won the first of four terms as United States Senator from New York. In the Senate, he was chairman of two powerful committees and played a major role in many major pieces of legislation. And he retired from the Senate in 2001 and died in 2003.

Pat Moynihan was a prolific writer, speeches, books, articles, and memoranda to Presidents. His papers from the Nixon White House years, including messages to the President, were opened this past July. The complex interplay between these two very important individuals is what today's panel is all about. And today's panel is exactly the sort of cooperation, the National Archives and the Richard Nixon Foundation, that is the essence of what our presidential libraries and their foundations work for. In this case, it's a cooperative effort designed to facilitate research into the ideas and activities of two prominent Americans, Pat Moynihan and Richard Nixon.

The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California, became part of the Archives Presidential Library System in 2007 and is one of the 13 Presidential Libraries maintained by the National Archives. The groundbreaking for the building that will house the 13th Presidential Library, the George W. Bush Library, takes place in Dallas next week. This past summer, the National Archives moved more than 42 million pages of Nixon administration documents from storage in the National Archives in College Park

to the Nixon Library in Yorba Linda, California. At the library, our archivists are continuing the process of opening them for review by academics, researchers, and the general public. I know firsthand that the Nixon Library is pleased to assist scholars, the general public, and the Nixon Foundation in encouraging discovery and discussion of the policies, events, and achievements of the Nixon era.

Now that the Nixon Archival Collection has been assembled in one place under the auspices of the National Archives, we can look forward to a wave of new work on this important man and his times. I was in Yorba Linda not too long ago and had an opportunity to talk with researchers from around the world hard at work on dissertations and books. I want to recognize two people from our archive staff who are involved with the Nixon records. Tim Naftali, the first federal director of the Nixon Library, and Sharon Fawcett, our assistant archivist who oversees all 13 presidential libraries for the National Archives. Now let me introduce Geoff Shepard, who is representing the Nixon Foundation, and who will tell you a little bit more about the other panels that we have sponsored earlier this year. Geoff.

Geoff Shepard: Thank you, David. As David said, the archives, which the Nixon Library now belongs to, has moved 42 million pages to the Nixon Library. And in celebration of that, we've been putting on a series of panels. In the great scheme of things, the archives owns the records. And if you remember Warren Beatty's famous quote from the movie "Shampoo", "We've got the hits". We know where the alumni are from Richard Nixon's staff, and we assemble these panels so they can talk about the why and the how these documents were written. It's a wonderful combination. It's 40 years late, but you see they're relatively young people, so it works. This may be our best panel because this is almost all of Pat Moynihan's young staff. And each of them, as you can tell from the program, each of them has gone on to a significant career. It was a magical time, and it was a very talented group of people. And you'll get to hear from them in just a second.

Richard Nixon may have been the best prepared individual to be president in our lifetime. Congressman, Senator, Vice President for two terms, and then seasoning as a private citizen for eight years. He knew what he wanted to do, and he wasn't afraid of new ideas. This is a man who had been on the public scene for decades. And he brought to his staff in senior capacities, the most senior capacities, three individuals who hadn't supported him in his campaigns. Henry Kissinger, who was a Rockefeller protégé, Arthur Burns, who was head of the Council of Economic Advisers under Eisenhower, and we believe his heart was still with Ike, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a liberal Harvard professor. And Nixon brought them in because he wanted an exchange of ideas. And what we're going to have today is reminiscence of one of those, of two

extraordinarily strong individuals, and the interplay of Pat Moynihan and Richard Nixon is what this panel is all about. With that, let me introduce our moderator. We're just tickled to death to have Steve with us. You can show your appreciation by buying his book. Steve?

Steve Weissman: Thank you, Geoff. And thank you for the generous offer to have you buy the book. Well, I'm so honored to be here. This book, which I want to talk about for a few minutes before we go into the panel, has been a labor of love. But it also was made possible because of the tremendous existence of these wonderful institutions, the Library, the Foundation, the National Archives, and of course the Library of Congress. I don't think I realize, and I don't know that Americans realize, what jewels in the crown of our government these institutions represent. They preserve our history. They make it possible for us to build on our experience collectively. The people who work there are generous with their time and effort. They helped me, many of them, on this book to try and understand Pat Moynihan's life and his times. And I'm so grateful that they exist, that they will always exist, and I'm grateful for AEI for playing host today to this panel. And I look forward to hearing the panelists in a minute. But I just wanted to, before I introduce them, tell you a little bit about my experience with Pat Moynihan over the last couple of years, and what brings me here today.

When Senator Moynihan died in 2003, he left the largest single collection of personal papers at the Library of Congress. I mean, going all the way back to Thomas Jefferson. They are spread in more than 3,700 boxes at the Library and out in Suitland. And they take up nearly 1,500 feet of shelf space, which the library points out is the equivalent of two Washington monuments laid end to end. So you can imagine, try to imagine what happened a couple of years ago as I was leaving the "New York Times" when the publisher and the Moynihan family came to me and said, well, how about a collection of papers from this repository, this vast repository?

And the library staff helped me figure out which boxes were going to have the letters because they were spread through not all 3,700 but through 700 or 800 of the boxes. And Pat, well, I'll get to that in a second. And they helped me navigate this project. And also one other fine institution I salute is the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, which helped to pay for the graduate students and graduates and students at Syracuse to actually go through the boxes, find the letters, photograph them under my supervision. And as many, as some of you know, Pat taught at Syracuse before...it was his first job and it was also his last job. He was an adjunct professor after he retired from the Senate. So it's no surprise that such a vast repository of papers exists for a man as productive as Pat Moynihan, who served four presidents and served four terms in the Senate. He delivered endless speeches and essays and public commentaries and he

wrote or co-wrote or edited more than 18 books. And they, as you all know, cover a staggering range of subjects which we'll discuss today.

But I've often been asked, okay, what do these letters add to what we know about Pat Moynihan? And he wrote to so many people, not just statesmen and politicians and constituents, but to celebrities. I mean, I came across letters to Woody Allen and Yoko Ono and Saul Bellow and John Updike and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. And to Brooks Brothers, to whom he complained about holes in his socks that he had just bought. I think that the letters do not paint for us a different Pat Moynihan, but a Pat Moynihan who was more anguished about his controversies, more self-absorbed, more vulnerable, more filled with both a sense of pride and on occasion a sense of grievance than the public perhaps understands. And so many of these emotions come out in the Nixon era letters, and we're going to talk about that period. So I just want to say a couple of contextual comments about that.

The emotions that we see through Pat Moynihan and his mixed feelings and his probing, and his intellectual probing into issues, especially of family and culture, actually begin in his diaries when he was a student at the London School of Economics in the early 1950s after the war. And we learn from those writings that he had this troubled and complicated relationship with his parents. His family suffered when his father abandoned the family at the height of the Great Depression. When Pat was only 10, he never saw his father again. And in public, Pat never talked very much about his upbringing. And we'll hear from his former colleagues, but I think it's also true that he didn't talk very much about it at all, even to his own family and his intimate friends.

But in the letters we can see how he suffers feeling let down by his mother and father, and how he talks about his, what he calls, "emotional attachment to father substitutes" and fear of rejection from them. Now, why am I going into this here? Well, I think that what comes out of his personality is something of what Pat represented and what a lot of us loved him for. First he was obviously passionate about the family. And only 12 years after he was writing about his own broken family, 12 years later, he was an assistant secretary of labor writing to Lyndon Johnson saying, directly to Johnson, you were born poor, you were brought up poor, you came of age full of ambition, energy, and ability because your mother and father gave it to you. The richest inheritance any child can have is a stable, loving, disciplined family life. And clearly, Pat was taking his personal experience, transmuting it into his policies, and talking to President Johnson as a young man about something that he never had himself.

But there was another aspect to this, which brings us to what we're going to talk about today, which is really a rare quality and especially now in this contentious time. And that is that out of this unstable life, Pat brought a lifelong devotion to

the stability of institutions and of government and of presidents, no matter which party they belong to. There's a really striking moment...Checker, I guess you were there, following President Nixon's resignation in 1974 when Pat addresses the embassy in India where he was ambassador. And he talks about how President Nixon was the third president in a row to be "destroyed" in office. He used the word "destroyed", but of course assassination, Johnson driven from office, Nixon effectively driven from office. But he adds, "There is, I think, an institutional dimension with which we who are in government whose concern is with such institutions, who are part of them, ought to be concerned." The letters remind us how hard it is to shore up institutions by trying to occupy the fractured center of American politics.

There's been a lot of attention paid to one particular quote, which George Will in one of his columns cited as a great quote, and I'll close with this, from Pat. In 2003 when he was quite sick and perhaps knowing that he didn't have that much time left, he took the trouble to sit down and write a note to himself which we found in the papers. And it recalled, in turn, some thoughts he had composed in lectures he had given to Harvard in the 1980s. "In some 40 years of government work, I have learned one thing for certain," he wrote in the last month of his life. "As I have put it, the central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself." And then the killer final sentence. "Thanks to this interaction, we are a better society today in nearly all respects than we were."

Not only in this comment does he define sort of the yin and yang of our politics, which we were all reminded when we, having gone through this election, but what I love about this quote is that Pat sees this interaction, which we all have a tendency to say is ugly and deplorable and isn't it awful that we're having these messy debates, that Pat felt that the debates over these questions are what make us healthy. We can't avoid them, their interaction strengthens us, and it strengthens our democracy. So I think that's what he brought to public life. And I think when you hear the stories that we're now gonna hear from our panelists, what he brought to the Nixon administration where he was a hybrid. He was an interloper in some ways, a Harvard professor, not the only one since Henry Kissinger was there as well. They didn't always get along so well.

And he saw things in that period that when we look at them today, he told Nixon about global warming in 1969. He tried to find new solutions to family and racial divisions. He advised Nixon to understand what was just starting as a feminist movement. And yet he also talked about preserving institutions and the stability, not just of families, but of American institutions, its institutions of higher education in particular, at a very contentious time. So, with those few

introductory remarks, let me first introduce our panel, which does not really need an extensive introduction.

But we'll hear first from Chris DeMuth, an old friend who was not only, of course, president of this great institute, AEI, from 1986 to 2008, but he was a staff assistant to the president from '69 to '70, and worked for Pat Moynihan on model cities and other programs. Later he practiced law, taught at the Kennedy School, and was a top official in the Reagan administration where I think we first met, Chris. Steve Hess, another old friend, was deputy assistant to the President in 1969 and was chief of staff to Pat Moynihan. He later served in the administration as chairman of the White House Conference on Children and Youth and he joined the Brookings Institution in 1972. And he's been a fellow on faculties at Harvard and George Washington University. He's written so many books about journalism and politics and leadership and he served at the UN General Assembly and the UNESCO General Conference.

John Price was counsel to Pat Moynihan in 1969 and later succeeded him as executive secretary of the Council for Urban Affairs and was special assistant to the president. He was a key staff member for Pat Moynihan on welfare, hunger, nutrition and urban growth policy, healthcare, insurance policy, health insurance policy, and he worked in New York for many years in finance and he's now president and CEO of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh. And finally Checker Finn, Chester E. 'Checker' Finn, who was staff assistant to the president in '69, '70 and worked with Pat there. He had been a doctoral student of Pat's at Harvard and later worked in New Delhi, and then in the U.S. Senate. And I think when you were working for him in the Senate, it was when we first met Checker. He's been a professor at Vanderbilt University, an assistant U.S. Secretary of Education, and a fellow at Brookings, Hudson Institute, Manhattan Institute, and president now of the Thomas Fordham Institute at Stanford's Hoover Institution, and a prolific writer about one of the best in the country on education issues. So let's go to the panel. And first, Chris, we'll hear from you. You want to come here, right? I'll leave the mic on.

Chris DeMuth: As a minor addendum to the collection and to Steve's book, there is in the handouts for this conference a transcript of Pat's remarks on the week he left the White House, Christmas week 1970, with some minor editing by me with due regard for Pat's stylistic idiosyncrasies. And I think it repays reading. We think 2010 has been a tumultuous political year, but it has been a genteel Tea Party compared to 1968, the year that brought Richard Nixon and Daniel Patrick Moynihan together.

In April, Martin Luther King Jr. was murdered in cold blood, igniting race riots across the nation where dozens of people were killed. Here in Washington, the anguished mobs numbered in the tens of thousands. Buildings stretching many

blocks up 14th Street burned for five days. 14,000 Marine and Army troops, the largest military occupation of a city since the Civil War, patrolled the streets and finally held the rioters at bay two blocks from the White House. Two months later, Robert Kennedy was murdered, point blank, the evening he won the California Democratic primary, which would have sealed his nomination for the presidency. In another 11 weeks at the Democratic Convention, Chicago was once again seized by bloody riots. That violence was merely the worst of the mayhem running throughout the year, the result of furious divisions over, first, the Vietnam War, and second, the circumstances of black Americans and poor city communities following the heady days of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the War on Poverty and Great Society programs.

Pat Moynihan, Harvard professor, director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies, was a liberal Democrat and had been campaigning with the anti-war Robert Kennedy the week before he was shot down. In the course of the year, Pat published two astonishing essays in *Commentary* magazine. In May, after King's murder, "The Democrats, Kennedy, and the murder of Dr. King." Then in August, after Kennedy's murder, "The professors and the poor."

"We," he wrote, "We liberal intellectuals have since 1960 been at the center of political power and have had our way on virtually everything we cared about. We began with supreme confidence in our ability to control events abroad and in our own society through bold interventions guided by our brilliant ideas and idealism that would confront injustice, right wrongs, and set the world swiftly on a better course, not only better, but more stable, more united, more harmonious. And after eight years, what have we got? Some historic achievements to be sure, the Civil Rights Act, but overwhelmingly national disintegration. Riot, bedlam, angry disillusionment, especially among the poor and the black on the one hand, and the privileged, educated young on the other, the rise of new forces of political radicalism and militancy, in some a republic, quote, approaching a condition of instability. Were we perhaps a bit too sanguine about the willingness of the world to exceed to the rational theorizing at which we excel?"

Quote, "We liberal Democrats had best begin asking this question of ourselves or else others, Richard M. Nixon for one, will surely be asking it for us." And of course, Pat was himself bristling with answers to get that conversation going. The architects of the war on poverty in great society had been disconnected from the actual harsh circumstances of black urban poverty, and oblivious to the intrinsic social pathologies that any serious anti-poverty effort would need to confront, especially joblessness and family disillusion. They had been too smitten with fancy abstractions, especially the community action idea at the center of the war on poverty, and too uninterested in practical necessities, especially the need to get large numbers of black adult males into the world of

work. And we good liberals have been too dismissive of conservative policy ideas. Here, he mentioned Milton Friedman's negative income tax and Melvin Laird's proposal to replace categorical federal grants with general-purpose revenue sharing.

Above all, the intelligentsia had been too little interested in mundane questions of program design, effectiveness, evaluation. That is to say, too little interested in results. These essays, addressed to political liberals filled with largeness of spirit, ardent to recover meaning and purpose from the ashes, were instrumental to Richard Nixon and Pat Moynihan finding each other. After the election, I was working at the Nixon transition office at the Pierre Hotel in New York City. The president-elect was intent on finding a general Democrat or two who might be induced to join his administration. He had been greatly stirred by the two articles in commentary by Professor Moynihan of Harvard, where I had recently graduated. Did I know the man? Might he be suitable? What did he go by? Was it Daniel or just Dan? I did know him slightly, at least well enough to specify his proper familiar name. And so I was dispatched as secret courier to Cambridge, Massachusetts, and I'm sure that historians will one day recognize my mission as the progenitor of Henry Kissinger's secret trips to Peking.

Preliminary discussions were held, possibilities explored. There was an exchange of documents. Pat was receptive, and when the president-elect and the professor met at the Pierre, they hit it off instantly. Let me emphasize three general features of the Nixon-Moynihan alliance. First, it was not only the traumas of 1964, but also the circumstance in that year but not very much longer, that both the Republican and Democratic parties had both liberal and conservative wings, which made bipartisan collaboration natural and genuine in a way that is difficult even to imagine today. Still, there is no other recent example of a prominent party activist of one party ranging freely around the top councils of a White House of the other party and being its spokesman on central issues of domestic policy. Something more was at work in the chemistry of the two men. Steve Weissman has said a bit about this, and Steve, I believe, will have more to say.

Second, both were intellectuals with strong practical streaks, acutely aware of constraints, of the inherent difficulties of things, interested in administration and political tactics, interested in results. This disposition earned each of them the contempt of many intellectuals before they met. Nixon, from the start of his political career, Pat in the angry reactions to the Moynihan report on the Negro family in 1965. Both felt the hurt of those experiences very acutely and surely shared and sympathized to a degree with each other's hurt. But what really brought them together was something positive, a shared fascination with the interplay of ideas and action, with the challenge of translating plausible ideas into practical results. Outflanking the yakety-yaks in the media and the

universities was only one aspect of that practical challenge. And Nixon was not at all averse to the professoriate per se. His first term White House was dominated by them as never before or since. The heavyweights with access and influence were Professors Moynihan, Kissinger, Arthur Burns, George Shultz, Paul McCracken, and Herb Stein.

Third, the criticism of Pat as an opportunist, happy to go with the flow of political power, which sometimes you heard back then and sometimes still echoes today, was and is a calumny. To be sure, Pat was a highly ambitious man, aware of his extraordinary gifts and determined to use them to move the world. But he was also, and from the beginning, long before he achieved any sort of renown, as principled a man as ever practiced politics, continuously assertive and argumentative in his captivating Irish way, on behalf of propositions he regarded as vital, and who routinely took enormous, potentially career-ending risks on behalf of those propositions. Thanks to Steve Weissman's magnificent collection, we can see Pat dropping notes to candidate Nixon and to his speechwriter confidant Ray Price in the course of the 1968 campaign. These were not the letters of a pandering office seeker.

For one thing, they were congruent with his arguments to Harry McPherson in the LBJ White House at the same time. Even more, they were congruent with Pat's *Professors and the Poor* essay to which I have alluded. There, he had lamented the omission from the poverty programs of an energetic effort to increase employment among black men. Read the essay, and then read his letter to Nixon of October 24th. He praises the candidate's recent campaign address for making it clear and explicit that employment is the key to social stability. Then he pivots to urging resistance to Republican businessmen who would tolerate more unemployment as the price of fighting inflation, on grounds that would translate into far higher black unemployment with terrible social consequences. Pat, in private, among kings and courtiers, was utterly at peace with Pat, the public intellectual.

I've called Pat's relationship with President Nixon an alliance, and it was genuinely such. The conventional wisdom is that Pat conceived his White House mission as saving the great society and poverty programs from retrograde republicanism, that he was a big spender, constantly at odds with the flinty tightwad Arthur Burns, that he invoked Disraeli to seduce Nixon away from genuine conservatism. This is a confusing oversimplification. For one thing, Pat could inveigh against government extravagance with the best of them, as in his vigorous opposition to the president's advocating government financing for a civilian supersonic airplane. For another, he would spend hours on the telephone with Nixon's liberal critics, advocating the administration's policy and decrying their opposition carnivals as "defecating in the streets". Actually, he used a different word than defecating. That's my expletive deleted.

For another, although he and Arthur Burns did indeed conduct a battle royal over welfare reform, the conservative-liberal divide was a very different thing in those days, and Burns himself was far from a tightwad, as we were to discover. Burns' tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve, 1970 through 1978, was an ignominious failure, precisely because he followed the counsel of Pat's campaign letter to Nixon, gearing monetary policy to the short-term unemployment rate rather than long-term price stability, and thereby producing a devastating upward spiral of both prices and unemployment. But I would like to make the point with a concluding war story of my own. My primary assignment in 1969 was to immerse myself in the Model Cities program and figure out what to do with it. Although President Nixon had told Pat to get rid of model cities, neither the President nor Pat nor anybody else in the White House had much idea of what the program was really about, and my charge from Pat was characteristically open-ended and amorphous.

Model cities enacted in 1966 had been the apotheosis of the great society programs, its crowning grandiose failure. This program promised to transform selected cities around the nation into gleaming, happy, problem-free Shangri-Las, succeeding where urban renewal and the war on poverty had failed through a combination of rational planning at the local level and massive concentration of funds from the federal level in response to those plans. I approached the program with the earnestness of youth and was horrified by what I discovered. The local plans were nothing but boilerplate grant seeking. The promise of vast federal funding had prompted frenzied expectations and summoned forth not a few hucksters and frauds. And there was not going to be any concentration of federal resources. To the contrary, the federal agencies administering current grants for job training, education, transportation, and the like were watching model cities closely. And when model cities made grants to the cities, the agencies redirected their own programs elsewhere. So model cities was effectively just writing checks to other Washington agencies with no effect on the ground.

When I summarized my disillusioned findings to Pat, I concluded that President Nixon had been right in his initial policy prescription, and I added a neoconservative twist. If our sole aim is to improve the circumstances of the urban poor, we should start by abolishing the model city's charade. Pat responded by arching his great eyebrows and saying, "Aha". Silence. And just how did I propose to do this? I hadn't a clue. I had done my homework. I'd produced a brilliant, incontrovertible analysis. Wasn't that enough? It was not. Indeed, my position, as I came later to recognize, was the perfect mirror image of the heedless liberal hubris of the poverty warriors that Pat had criticized in those 1968 essays. But Pat did know what to do.

Mel Laird's idea, that he'd written about, of broad federal revenue sharing with states and localities, although addressed to the old pathologies of the categorical grant programs, was even better suited to the new pathologies of model cities. A distinguished task force was assembled and commissioned, chaired by Edward C. Banfield, his Harvard colleague, and staffed by me, consisting of leading experts on federal, local, fiscal, and management issues, following weeks of deliberation and then hours of cabinet meetings, the model cities experience became the forge, the touchstone, for formulating the administration's new federalism initiative, combining model cities and innumerable other federal programs into new, large, general-purpose revenue sharing, enacted with bipartisan support in 1974. Pat did not reflexively save the model cities that we had inherited. He recognized its excesses without dwelling on them and engaged conservative decentralizing ideas to the task of transforming it into something better, more realistic, more politically sustainable.

Four years later, sitting in a law school student lounge watching the Watergate drama unfold on television, I thought to myself, there certainly had been a very large number of very young men running around the Nixon White House, young men with capacious assignments and often more testosterone than experience and judgment. We Moynihan junior staffers had been part of all that. It was Pat's lifelong practice to throw eager young academics and activists into big ponds to see if they would sink or swim. But in our case, we never lacked for adult supervision. Working with Pat, the incandescent intellectual, was an experience never to be equaled, but more important was working with Pat, the astute, practical politician, affable, clubbable, yet intently focused on engineering ideas into results, guided by his own highest ideal of maximum feasible betterment. For us, the lessons of a lifetime. For Pat, the harbinger of greatness to come.

Steve Weissman: Very beautiful and very moving, Chris. Steve Hess.

Steve Hess: Okay, I should just say, Chris, that when Pat Moynihan moved to Washington at that time in December and took over Averill Harriman's mansion in Georgetown as his own, drank his wine as his own, and it just said, and it says, here's your staff, I was to be the chief of staff, And I said, my God, to myself, I'm going to be sitting on a nest of hummingbirds. I mean, it was 22-year-old Chris DeMuth. You just heard him. And we were just about the staff. There's a couple missing. One who's not here was Dick Blumenthal, who was also 22 years old, the senator-elect from Connecticut. I should say that Dick had a...Pat and I had offices in the basement of the West Wing, and the others were in now the Eisenhower executive office. Dick had a desk outside my office. His, speaking for him, since he's not here, he had the most minor part of our agenda, which happened to be the District of Columbia. Washington, D.C. did not have home rule. And if it were ever known, I think publicly, that we had

turned over the District of Columbia to a 22-year-old, I think we would have been in a lot of trouble, but he was a very smooth 22-year-old.

At any rate, I had, I think I have, the unique position of having been the only person who was a friend of Richard Nixon's and Pat Moynihan's before they knew each other. And so I thought I'd like to start where Chris put us, and that's where they actually meet in the Hotel Pierre in early December. In the transition in 1968, Pat has come down from Cambridge to hear what the president-elect is going to propose for him in urban affairs. I've come up from Washington to have dinner with him immediately after he sees the president to review whether this makes a lot any sense for Pat.

He comes down for the meeting. We go into the dining room and I say, "Well," and he says, "I can't believe it, how ignorant he is. He doesn't know anything about domestic affairs." And that should not have surprised some of the old timers. Dick Nixon, this terribly smart person, had been consumed through his life by geopolitics and by international affairs. In fact, I can remember when on election day in 1962, running for governor of California, and he called me and I said, Dick, do you still think you're going to lose today? And he said, yeah, but at least I'm never going to have to talk about crap like dope addiction again. This was not... So... Pat Moynihan instantly learned something that was a very, very valuable lesson. He learned as a professor that he was going to have a student who was the President of the United States, and it was a tabula rasa that he could work on that remarkable mind of Richard Nixon's.

So on January 20th, Nixon becomes president, Pat Moynihan becomes the assistant to the president for urban affairs, the executive secretary of a new institution which supposedly was modeled after the National Security Council, which would have the president, the vice president, and appropriate cabinet, domestic cabinet members. At that time, or I should say on August 8th of that year, Richard Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan, a guaranteed income for families with children, perhaps the most radical proposal of our lifetime and from a president who had opposed it in the campaign. And what I will try to do in a couple stages of how this friendship or this collaboration got from here to there.

I should say at the same time, the President appointed Arthur Burns, distinguished Columbia University economist, to his White House staff as well, and in his memoirs, says that he had appointed Burns as a conservative as a counterbalance to Moynihan, the liberal perhaps. It did work out that way, but the memoirs came ten years later, and memoirs we know are a way of tidying up history. Actually there were two unrelated reasons for the appointment of both. Chris has mentioned one in the case of Moynihan. Clearly Nixon, a divisive force in politics through his career, who had just won an incredibly close

election and was going to have a bring-us-together theme, really importantly needed a prominent Democrat on his staff. He had wanted Scoop Jackson to be the Secretary of Defense. Jackson, the senator, didn't want the job, and he approached Moynihan, who was receptive for the reasons that Chris mentioned.

In many ways, after the Moynihan Report, he was something of a pariah in the political arm of his own, of the Democratic party. Arthur Burns was a different situation, an old friend of the President from the Eisenhower years, and he was penciled in to be the chairman of the Federal Reserve. The only problem was that job, a term job, was not to be available until January of 1970. And what do you do with Burns in the meantime? Well, the answer is you treat him with great respect. He put him on the staff, he made him counselor, he was the only member of the staff who had cabinet rank. And he gave him a broad jurisdiction of domestic affairs, which of course was greater than Moynihan's of urban affairs.

Alan Greenspan last week, in another session like this that Steve was running said, "Well of course in this competition, Burns was gonna win. He just expected that would be." That was not the way it ultimately ended up, at least with the Family Assistance Plan, is really what I'm gonna touch on, the various elements that went into this. The first one, by the way, is very clearly in this remarkable book that Steve Weissman has put together, beautifully edited. And if you go to the section that includes the memoranda that Moynihan sent to Nixon, you will see what I think are the most remarkable set of documents that anybody in the West Wing, a staffer, sent to the President of the United States.

They are called memoranda, that is clearly mislabeled. Memoranda of the President usually are one page long and are PowerPoint-ish and are something easy reading for the most busiest executive in the world. These, on the other hand, are long, they're complicated, they're convoluted, and what is so interesting when you read them, they are written to an intellectual. They are written not to a politician but to an intellectual. And Nixon loved this. He read them. He started to write marginal notes. He started to send them to other people, which was a disaster for Pat because they leaked, of course, immediately. And I don't think that this was a plot, a strategy on the part of Pat Moynihan. It's just the way he is. He wrote these things. He sent them to the president. And this is the set of argumentation that you can read that based his first year at the White House. That was the first thing in the element.

The second thing was the process. John may wish to talk more about it because he was more intimately directly involved in the Urban Affairs Council. But this was a way in which Pat could suggest to the President what issues should be taken up, then set up committees to do that, and the chair to run that, and the staff to run that. And it meant that all of this, including the Family Assistance

Plan, came through the council so that Arthur Burns and Marty Anderson, his very talented surrogate deputy, were defensive. They had to respond to proposals that had come from the Moynihan operation. This was very important strategically.

I should say, by the way, you who know the intra-administration struggles through the writings of Bob Woodward really need to be reminded that this was not like that at all. This is as it should have been really. This was dueling Ivy League professors. They were not nasty, they were not mean people. Pat I think truly respected Arthur Burns, I assume Arthur Burns did as well. The only thing is that they disagreed, that's all. The discussions, John may remember, there was a discussion, for instance, about late 18th century British poor laws. Can you imagine sitting in the cabinet room arguing about this? And that both sides are rushing out to get distinguished historians to back us up. I mean, we've got Gertrude Himmelfarb on our side. We've got Jack Plummer from Cambridge on our side. And this is what's going on. I don't mean that these folks were not above a little banter that could move their point, making a point or two. Remember John, Marty Anderson wanted to push Pat into a position to say his proposal was a negative income tax. Of course, it was a negative income tax, but those were dirty words that you shouldn't use it.

So at one point, Marty is saying, "Let's call a spade a spade". And Pat says, as Oscar Wilde said, "Anyone who calls a spade a spade should be compelled to use one". Now, I thought he made that up, but actually I looked it up and he didn't make it up. That was Pat Moynihan. We didn't win all of them, by the way, let me make sure. Pat at one point was very concerned about American Indians who were moving from the reservation into the cities. And to take over that piece of the action, he needed the Secretary of the Interior on the Urban Affairs Council, and he would send a memo to the President to put Walter Hickel on, and the President ignored it. He would send another memo to put Walter Hickel, and the President ignored it. Finally, he wore down the President, and he agreed, okay, you can have Walter Hickel if you want him.

And so the two of us, Pat and I, go over to the Department of the Interior. If you've ever seen the office of the Secretary of the Interior, it is probably the largest office in Washington. It looks like a football field with a desk in the middle. And so we go in there, and Pat greets the Secretary, the new member of the Urban Affairs Council, and he said, we would be honored, Mr. Secretary, if you would chair a committee on the urban Indians. And Hickel says, "Indian. No, no, no. Water. I've got water. Indians. I don't have Indians. Water. I have Indians". And the two of us look at each other and we want to turn around and run out of there, but we back out of it. And so we never, Pat never got a chance to do anything about the urban Indians, I'm afraid.

Okay. We had this process going. We had the memos. And the next thing we had, which is very interesting and shouldn't really figure in many White Houses, but it was there. And that is Pat's humor. Pat's humor was a major asset in that White House. Remember, we're not talking about Aaron Sorkin's West Wing, full of people running in and out and so forth with quips. This was Bob Haldeman's White House, a very gray place, very quiet. The feeling around it was the president is working, let's be quiet. And there was Pat Moynihan, who, as the president later said, "I didn't agree with him, but he was saying he would light up the sky". Everybody on the panel should have at least one Moynihan story.

One of my favorites is in the summer of that year, '69, the president had gone off to San Clemente, which is, of course, wonderful. It means that it's quiet and you can get a lot of work cleared off your desk. Pat has gone off to the White House swimming pool to take a dip. That was before Nixon did something dreadful. He put a roof on top of it and made it more room for the reporters. And so suddenly I get a call at my office, "Quick, come up to the Oval Office". So I go up to the Oval Office. The door is open, Pat is standing there. We look in this Oval Office, which has been remodeled while the President is away, and it looks like an MGM Technicolor set of how an Oval Office should look. The gold is so bright that my son who's over there may remember when he was a little kid walking in there and he was sort of blinded by the gold. And on every seat of every chair, there is the seal of the presidents. There's a phone right at the door to the Oval Office. He picks up, Pat picks up the phone, he says, may I get Mr. Haldeman please? Bob, I'm standing at the Oval Office, it's just been a, yeah, yeah, famous interior decorator from New York, yeah, yeah. Great friend of Mrs. Nixon, yeah, yeah. Pat, unless you do something, members of Congress are going to be farting on the seal of the presidency. That was Pat Moynihan. By the way, the seals came off instantly. That was Pat Moynihan.

This humor was very, very useful. The next thing, so we have the memos, we have the process, we have the humor. Then there was the chemistry. Given that this was the oddest couple in public life that wasn't scripted by Neil Simon, you have to think of the fact that something unusual was happening. Now old Nixon hands knew the phrase "The boss is in love." "The boss is in love" was something that very often, the president just had to have some special character around who was contributing something to him. It might have been John Connolly at one time. It might have been Pete Peterson. In the spring of '69, it was Pat Moynihan. And they went off for conversations. And they talked about books. And the president said, "What should I be reading, Pat?" And Pat will say, "Well, why don't you try Blake's biography of Disraeli?"

Okay, now, the things are going like this, except that every president knows that he's got 100 days, and after 100 days, the press is looking down and, where's

your program? And now it's May and June and July, and Pat Moynihan and Arthur Burns are still fighting. And this is getting very irritating to the president by this time. He can hardly wait to sort of get rid of both of them and bring in the calm that John Ehrlichman will bring to the domestic council. And so we get to August 6th. John knows this better than I. And the President takes the whole cabinet to Camp David and he's going to tell them that he's decided for the Family Assistance plan. And the meeting is six hours.

And the one who was strongest against it, always have been strongest against it, was the vice president, who says, in effect, "Mr. President, this is political suicide. You're giving money to these people who have always been against you and are going to continue to be against you." And the president leaves there and concludes, "You know, I've only got three members of the cabinet with me." This is Lincoln-esque almost. Fortunately for him, one of those three members was the only truly brilliant mind in his cabinet, and that was George Shultz. That was a great help to him. George Shultz was so unknown to Richard Nixon that he didn't even know how to spell his name when he appointed him. He was the dean of the business school at the University of Chicago. Probably the most marginal position in a Republican administration is Secretary of Labor.

But George Shultz was the little man who sat at the end of the cabinet table, and after very windy former Republican governors had said whatever they had to say, he somehow would quietly bring it all together. And the president got more and more interested in him and gave him a special role in helping to bring together the Family Assistance Plan, and then ultimately, of course, made him the budget director and the secretary of the treasury. Okay, we go to the next day, which is now the 7th of August. And the President tells the senior White House staff that he's going with the Family Assistance Plan. And he muses, well as Randall Churchill said of Disraeli, "It's Tory men with liberal principles that shape the world." The next day, he goes on television and announces that he is going to make this proposal to the Congress. What's the result of this? Well, Arthur Burns was a wise man, and he asked all of the right questions. He would say, "How do you know that this is going to stabilize families?" And the answer is we don't know. But he was proposing caution.

And Daniel Patrick Moynihan was proposing the possibilities of greatness. And that was very important to a president who was influenced of his legacy. And that's where it sort of remained in my mind, until fast forward to a year later. I'm now the National Chairman of the White House Conference on Children, December 1970. The President is coming to a big hotel here to give the first address. I'm only concerned in introducing him that I've got an audience that may not be very friendly. And the president starts his address, it's somewhere here, December 13th. And he says, "Over a year ago, I propose that for the first time in American history, we in this great rich country establish a floor under

the income of every American family with children. We called it the Family Assistance Plan. It has in turn been called by others the most important piece of domestic legislation to be introduced in Congress in two generations. In terms of its consequences for children, I think it can be fairly said to be the most important piece of social legislation in the history of this nation."

Then Richard Nixon goes on in a way, and I had once been a speechwriter, that goes more deeper into himself than I'd ever heard him before. He says, "I remember back in the depression years, the 1930s, how deeply I felt about the plight of those people my own age who used to come into my father's store where they couldn't pay the bill because their fathers were out of work, and how this seemed to separate them from the others in our school. None of us had any money in those days, but those in the family where there was no job and there was nothing but a little relief that offered, they often suffered far more than simply going without. What they suffered was a hurt to their pride that many carried with them for the rest of their lives. We were poor by today's standards. And I suppose we were poor even by depression standards. But the wonder of it was that we didn't know it. Somehow, my mother and father, with their love, their pride, their courage, and their self-sacrifice, were able to create a spirit of self-respect in our family so that we had no sense of being inferior to the others who had more."

Now, this of course is the nub of Moynihan's social policy. Pat was a child of the city poor, Richard Nixon of the small town America. I doubt that they ever talked about this, ever. But I think that Pat somehow appealed to something that was greater than a president's place in history, he is also appealing to Richard Nixon's own history. And I think that entered into it too.

I should add a PS to this, by the way, because I found out later that the president got up in the middle of the night and started to make notes for this speech. And the next morning, it must have been 5 or 6 in the morning, there's a call. The phone rings. I wake up, and the operator said, the President wishes to speak to you. And I got a line, Mr. President, he says, "Steve, how come my speech is on page eight of the New York Times?" I hadn't seen it all, so I sort of groped. I said, "Well, how'd the Washington Post do?" "Oh, yeah, it's fine. It's the lead story in the Washington Post." And I said, "Well, what's the byline on the Times?" And he says, "It's the AP." And I said, "Oh. You see, the Times had assigned Ann Robertson to write the story, but her husband is desperately sick and she's in the hospital. And they wouldn't lead the New York Times with an Associated Press story." Thank you, hung up. I mean, it meant so much to him that this message got out as he delivered it. Well, the end of the story, of course, is that the family assistance plan got easily through the House of Representatives and then lost in the Senate Finance Committee, the committee that Pat in later life would chair.

Steve Weissman: John Price. Richard Nixon a Tabula Rasa?

John Price: I don't think so, but Steve was closer to that stage certainly than I. It was late in November of 1968 and my campaign boss, Len Garment, told me that the President had been intrigued, a little earlier than the points that Chris DeMuth talked about, intrigued when Pat Moynihan, a Democrat who was viewed principally as an academic but also had sought elective office as a Democrat in New York City, wrote a piece following the 1966 elections that had come to Nixon's attention. And as Moynihan put it in a memo to John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman in July of 1970, Moynihan, quote, "I proposed that American politics were approaching instability and that liberals who understood this should seek out and make alliances with their conservative equivalents in order to preserve democratic institutions from the looming forces of the authoritarian left and right."

This offers deep insight, and it goes to the points made by several of you already. To me, this offers a deep insight into one of Moynihan's core beliefs, which was, if not the sanctity, then the urgent necessity of institutions commanding, that is, deserving, and receiving respect. This was surely his view of the presidency. The memo I just mentioned of July 24th, I think 1970, is one of the most important Moynihan wrote while in Nixon's White House. And discussion today has turned around a lot of the points in it. Back to 1968. Len Garment told me the president was about to offer Moynihan a position in the White House. Len asked that I run a few checks about Pat. And as I say here, I'm sure others were asked to do so. And you heard a little bit more from different sides of the screen. But Len basically said, "Please run the political traps on Moynihan." And he obviously offered the other job to Kissinger, and the president might have been wondering whether yet another Democrat could be a bridge too far for the White House.

He wasn't sure whether Moynihan would be solid or incendiary. And so he wanted, the President wanted someone to help to try to shape his response to the urban crises that had shaken the country for several years now in a more considered and structured way. And he thought that the head of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies might be a valuable ally. And after a few days of phoning around, I told Len I thought Moynihan would be serious about wanting to help. He was a vivid personality, but profoundly respectful of the institution of the presidency. And I felt he would continue to be a deep and devoted observer of the social and cultural underpinnings of our country and of trends and data which social policy needs to take account of. Everything I would say, again, these 42 years later about Pat.

The offer was duly made, Moynihan accepted, and the array of praise and criticism from many in the party, which Nixon no doubt expected, occurred. Len

then suggested that I might be a fit for Moynihan's White House staff, and he cobbled us together. Some weeks later, I met for my first time with Daniel Patrick Moynihan. It was December 20th, it was lunch, and it was my 30th birthday. When he learned that, I quickly learned two key things about Pat Moynihan. The first was his warmth and generosity. He immediately ordered a half a bottle of wine and drank a toast to my birthday, and he offered me the job. I accepted. The second was central to what he would bring to his new job. He talked of race relations. He told me that the American version of slavery was among the most pernicious the world had ever seen, beyond the ancient Greek or the Brazilian, because of its wrenching apart of families. This was a concise summary for me of his noted report on the American Negro family from the mid-1960s. But he went on to say something I will never forget. It was partly because of the beautifully Irish turn of phrase, but more due to the hope and the passion with which it was said. But John, America has it within its gift to become the first truly multiracial society in history.

I think it was his fond hope that he would now work from the highest perch in his career for a president who he felt had great intellectual curiosity. He sensed he, Moynihan, could have charge of an institutional structure which he would shape and which could give him a formal leg up in the internal wars which, as a realist, he knew would be part of the landscape. Finally, he came to the job with a strategic sense of what was to be done. We needed an income strategy. This would help us make sense of all kinds of problems. And as we shall see, it led to early and coherent related policy changes, such as abolition of income tax on families below the poverty line, to food stamp increases of dramatic proportion, and most visibly, as you've heard, in August of '69, to the proposal on welfare known as the Family Assistance Plan.

But Pat brought with him not only a coherent strategy which had program implications. At least as important was his conviction about the central role of sound social science research. This was an approach or a discipline, not a package of particular programs. Setting the problem correctly would help get the right answers. And Moynihan felt the government had to get right answers. It went to the root of one of his cardinal convictions, that the institutions of society needed to be doing the right thing to continue to enjoy the support of the people. One of the most pointed pieces of broad advice he gave to the President in a long memo of January 3, 1969, to the President-elect was simple. Quote, "Your task then is clear, to restore the authority of American institutions." Close quote. He felt that harnessing solid research was the starting point for getting things right, which would lead to a public conviction that their government had its wits about it. We see this time and again. Checker Finn will illustrate this in his talk about education and Moynihan's engagement with academics about the impact of economic and social factors in achievement.

Early also in the administration, Pat got deeply involved about early child development, and he went to a Bruno Bettelheim who had written a book called "Children of the Dream" about the effects on young, young children in the kibbutzim in Israel. And Pat wove that into an argument for the president, which led the president immediately almost in his administration to declare the emphasis on the first five years of life and to create an office of child development in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. One of the most delightful recollections I have of Pat was on occasions when he would talk with great excitement of the research resources of the government. His excitement was first that so much had been done. There was so much out there, even though a lot of it was admittedly silly or worthy of things like famous then Senator William Proxmire's Golden Fleece Award for preposterous misuses of taxpayer funds. So sure, there was a lot of that. But beyond the academic's pleasure at the sheer volume of good social science research was Pat's determination to harness it, to make use of it in looking at policy options.

Yes, Pat was an experienced bureaucrat, and yes, he was a publicist and knew how to keep himself in front of the people. But there was always in him an excitement about finding the relevant nuggets in social science work. He kept up a massive correspondence with academics and social scientists to pick their brains and sift competing theories. With the right underpinning, policy could be right. In that same July 1970 memo to Ehrlichman and Haldeman, he spoke of the Principle of Policy-Oriented Government. That's initial caps. He and the President seemed to share some of this excitement, although the President necessarily would add a dash of politics and his own conviction when a major policy decision was at hand, like welfare reform.

Yet in that debate, as we've already heard, there were memos going over the presidential transom on Speenhamland, the 1834 British Poor Laws. I remember walking out one Sunday afternoon at lunchtime. I was working on the stuff supporting the welfare reform. Arthur Burns and I happened to walk out at the same moment, each of us contesting for the President's attention on welfare reform and its direction. We walked over to a little cafeteria on the north side of K Street, had a great lunch. I learned of Arthur Burns' vehement opposition to the Vietnam War at that point in mid-1969. We said not a thing about welfare reform, went back to our desks, and continued the battle. Anyway, Pat could see and would argue that there was coherence in the President's program. He was after all proud that this was true. He was all the more deeply frustrated when he felt that policies were neither well understood nor well promulgated by other members of the President's administration. Pat would occasionally, with the President's blessing, assemble groups of assistant secretaries to brief them on the outline and the detailed program proposals which the President had decided. He felt that a clear exposition of policy would help them to get out as the janissaries to sell and clarify the President's programs.

Steve talked for a little bit about the creation of the Urban Affairs Council. Let me just take a moment on that. Yes, it was modeled on the National Security Council. I mentioned in the panel on welfare reform some months ago that Pat had tasked me to go out and see if there were any analogies other than the National Security Council. I vetted an OEO Economic Opportunity Council and the HUD convener power of the secretary, and I concluded in a memo to the president through Pat that he's going to have to sit there, that cabinet members are heliotropic. They like to turn and face the sun and not each other. And Nixon did, in fact, chair 21 of the first 23 meetings of the Urban Affairs Council. So Pat had his machinery. This point was mentioned earlier. He had the bureaucratic mechanism by which he could set the agenda to a great extent. And we even had a little bit later something called the "Undersecretaries Group", which Pat asked me to chair, which was a direct analogy to a subsidiary of the NSC, of the National Security Council, called the "Operations Coordinating Board", which I had done a paper on in the summer of 1960. It was sort of the implementation arm of the NSC. And so we did that with the Undersecretaries Group, designed again to make sure the policies rolled out.

As Steve mentioned, committees were created, internal migration, welfare reform, food and nutrition, later new towns and urban growth. Not one apparently on urban Indians. Also, there had been proposed initially a subcommittee on crime. You may remember the former law partner and campaign manager of the president was a man named John Mitchell. And John Mitchell said simply, veto. We never had a committee on crime. It never met. So that was a very instructive lesson for Pat. So he took comfort that he had some bureaucratic machinery, and yet finally it was undercut in the debate around the welfare reform. And what became obvious was that there were competing power centers and players pulling at the president's sleeve.

Yet in that first spring, it was enormously exciting. And let me go back to Pat's own words, written later, maybe a year and a half later. Pat said, "I am sufficiently professional about political ideas to have had some feeling for what could be done, and by and large, we did it. Those Urban Affairs Council meetings might have seemed chaotic and ill staffed to some. But in about four months, I would dare to argue that we gave an intellectual *raison d'etre* to the Nixon administration. I was trying to put together something more than a random collection of programs. I was looking for programs based on Republican ideas or precedents, or barring that, which would make sense to Republicans." And that's very much what he tried to do with the welfare reform.

And we were mentioning that the president got impatient about a domestic program. Actually, it was sooner than July or August, because right before Easter in mid-March, the president began sending dunning notices to Steve and Pat, and he said, "Where's my domestic program?" And so April 1st of 1969,

this tome went down to Key Biscayne to be the president's Easter weekend reading. And in it, Moynihan summarized the basic content of it by saying that there were eight proposals, but they had three fundamental themes, and one of which is the one we're dwelling on here. The reduction of poverty through employment and income support and a couple of others. And then in the polemicist's gift or sense, which Pat certainly had, he said, "I call your attention above all to the family security system," which was the earlier name for what became the welfare reform FAP, or Family Assistance Plan. "For two weeks' growth in the gross national product, you can all but eliminate family poverty in America and make history." So he knew where to appeal to his man.

The details weren't yet worked out. But the battle lines were only beginning to take shape. One little personal story. The draft before the one that went down, I had done this, taking it out of the work of the committee of the Urban Affairs Council on Welfare. There were a couple of opposing options, which again, we gave the President. Here's one option, here's another option, you choose. And I gave it to Pat and on the morning of March 23rd, I think it was, and he then called me in his office at the end of that day and he said to me, slapping this thing in front of me, he said, "Price, your prose is opaque." So I stayed up all night long, and he had on his desk the next morning at 7 the draft which went to the president. This is another wonderful side of Pat. He had this volcanic temper. It was a little stronger than what I said to you, like towering cumulus clouds in summer. But then they would so quickly dissipate, and there would be the warmth and the charm and the friendship and the encouragement. I remember he was so generous to us. I suspect Steve would recall, but that first Christmas, Pat had made for each of us cufflinks of silver at Shreve's jewelry store in Boston. And on the outer part of the cufflink were our initials, and inside were DPM. Just a wonderful, sweet touch of his warmth.

Pat also showed flexibility. Having come in, and this is important, as an advocate of the children's allowance, which was basically what George McGovern proposed in '72, extraordinarily expensive with the notion that it would all be taxed back. You'd give a children's allowance to John D. Rockefeller IV, but you'd tax it back. Huge price tag on it, but very much in fashion, very much thought to be the right answer by some of the goo-goo groups, the business groups and others who were focusing on this. But he showed flexibility because he was willing to leave that. And when we reverted to the basically Republican idea of Milton Friedman's and of the Ripon Society as a Republican think tank, which had helped to gin up a negative income tax statute in 1967-68, he bought into it immediately and he became an absolutely tireless advocate for it.

He and Nixon saw eye to eye on the divisive implications of many of the services programs. He liked the income strategy. He had this wonderful phrase,

which to a kid who spent summers on his grandfather's dairy farm is intelligible. He said, "The services strategy is like feeding the sparrows by feeding the horses." Now, if you think that through, you sort of get the picture. Anyway, it was a typically Moynihan-esque, colorful way of making the point that you don't want to go through a lot of intermediaries and other things. Let's get to the point of income and disposable income in the hands of families. What do we say to summarize Pat? He was an intellectual in politics, but very much a politician, who could sing "Goodbye, My Coney Island Baby" while munching on Nathan's famous hot dog in the middle of a campaign. He was a man in remarkable synchronization with the president he served. A man who spoke truth to power. A colorful, even flamboyant wit, and yet a man passionately committed to his country.

Steve Weissman: And now Checker Finn to talk about education.

Checker Finn: I think we're making your life easier as a moderator by all the available airtime with opening remarks.

Steve Weissman: I was about to say that.

Checker Finn: Those are three tough acts to follow. I'll do my best, and I'll go as fast as I can. When I sat down a couple of weeks ago to write these notes, who should be on the front page of that day's "New York Times" but Pat Moynihan, seven and a half years after his death. The immediate context that day was a discussion of the culture of poverty and how it is now legitimate, indeed important, to attend to this ticklish topic that had been taboo for such a long time, especially since the ruckus that began with the Moynihan Report in 1965. Yet Pat might also have been, as easily have been, in that day's front page story in the Times about education reform. Because of his role in another transformation of American society, that, as it happens, began just one year after the Moynihan Report. I refer, of course, to the Coleman Report on equality of educational opportunity, a report that, as Pat often recalled, was quietly released over the Fourth of July weekend in 1966 by a department of HEW that hoped nobody would notice it. Well, Pat noticed it. And American education these past four decades has been profoundly altered as a result of that noticing.

Now Pat didn't write that report, Jim Coleman did. But Pat swiftly grasped its significance and began a multi-faceted, multi-year campaign to get it noticed. From an article in the public interest, to the Harvard faculty seminar that he got Carnegie Corporation to pay for, to the important book that he and the distinguished statistician Frederick Mosdellar published in 1972. And of course, his work in the Nixon White House, which I'll turn back to in just a second. The Coleman Report and its data have been exhaustively analyzed and reanalyzed and interpreted and reinterpreted over the years and have been invoked in any number of debates about any number of education issues. I won't rehearse all

that here, but one key finding has really never been challenged and it's the one that has probably and I think profoundly transformed our elementary secondary education policies. It was of course the finding that school inputs, things like money and teachers and teacher credentials have almost no correlation with school outcomes, namely pupil achievement, and that differences in achievement could not be accounted for by differences in school resources.

Before Coleman, everybody assumed that if you wanted different results from your schools, you would invest more money in them, or add more teachers, or buy more books, or computers, or whatever, because you assumed you could affect outcomes by changing inputs. Coleman showed that by and large that just isn't true. And of course that conclusion, along with some complicated and ambiguous findings about peer group and race and family, is exactly why HEW found this report so awkward in 1966, where Lyndon Johnson was still president at the time, and he had spent much of the previous two years persuading Congress that the way to end poverty and equalize achievement in America was to lavish federal dollars on the education system through a host of unprecedented new government programs like Title One and Head Start. But if Coleman was right, these programs wouldn't do much good, which meant, of course, that if you cared about boosting achievement in schools, you had to find other ways to do it, beginning with a new focus on achievement itself rather than on the resources of schools.

It's taken a while for that lesson to sink in in American education, and it hasn't still totally at this moment sunk in. Yet I submit that the single greatest change in American K-12 education these past four decades is that we now focus overwhelmingly on the results themselves, on measuring them, understanding them, comparing them, fretting about gaps in them, setting standards for them, creating assessments and accountability systems keyed to them, and devising new strategies to alter them, strategies that today range from charter schools to online learning to Teach for America and so forth. And that change can be traced pretty directly to the Coleman Report and its foremost interpreter, the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Now to the Nixon White House, where I worked with him on education policy.

Although what Nixon proposed to Congress in March of 1970, we're about a year after the Family Assistance Plan at this point in the chronology, though what Nixon proposed to Congress in March of 1970 did not have much immediate effect on what Congress did in the education sphere, both the House and the Senate at the time were still very much in the LBJ mode, a couple of key proposals did come to pass in ensuing years. And I think far more important, the basic analysis underlying the Nixon proposals is today taken for granted in federal education policy and in most states and districts as well. And

that was Moynihan's Coleman-based analysis put into the President's voice, transmitted to Congress, and spread across the landscape.

Far from continuing in the Great Society mode, Moynihan, via Nixon, began to point the country in a very different direction with respect to our understanding of our schools. Let me quote from the President's message to Congress on elementary secondary education from March 1970. This is from the White House documents. "We must stop letting wishes color our judgments about the educational effectiveness of many special compensatory programs. We must stop congratulating ourselves for spending nearly as much money on education as does the entire rest of the world, when we are not getting as much as we should out of the dollars we spend. Apart from the general public interest in providing teachers an honorable and well-paid professional career, there is only one important question to be asked about education. "What do the children learn?" Less than four years after Coleman's study, his central finding had made its way to the nation's foremost bully pulpit and had become the basis for a substantial White House initiative. I will confess, I do not know how important this was to Richard Nixon himself. I know it was important to Pat, though, and I know that on these key issues, he prevailed in a White House working group that included Ed Morgan from the Ehrlichman team, Ed was my other boss at the time after the White House staff got reorganized, the very able Lou Butler from HEW, Jim Allen, the Commissioner of Education at the time, smart, tough-minded Dick Nathan from OMB, and a bunch of others. And the working group's recommendations prevailed with the President.

There wasn't much pushback from other parts of the executive branch either. These recommendations didn't cost very much. Indeed, they can also be described as a response to a Congress that wanted to spend lots more on education. And it also needs to be noted that the White House high command had plenty of other things on its mind, ranging from school desegregation to, as I said, the billions of dollars that Congress wanted to spend. But seen through a different lens, these Nixon recommendations from 1970 were a very big deal. They were part of a fertile, open-minded, do-the-right-thing-even-if-it-upsets-apple-carts reformist era during the first couple of years of the Nixon administration. We've already spoken here of welfare reform and revenue sharing as other examples. And they were very much part of the intellectually honest and policy-minded approach that Pat Moynihan brought to the White House.

A little bit more quotation, if you'll bear with me, from the President's message in March 1970. "What makes a good school? The old answer," this is Nixon 40 years ago, "was a school that maintained high standards of plant and equipment, that had a reasonable number of children per classroom, whose teachers had good college and often graduate training. This was a fair enough definition as

long as it was assumed that there was a direct connection between school characteristics and the learning that takes place in a school. Years of educational research,” I’m still quoting Nixon, “culminating in the Equal Opportunity Survey of 1966 have, however, demonstrated that this direct uncomplicated relationship does not exist. And yet, observed the President in words that are italicized in the White House Press Office document, “we know that something does make a difference. The outcome of schooling, what children learn, is profoundly different for different groups of children and different parts of the country.”

I could go on in this vein, and Nixon did, but the point I think worth underscoring is that three decades before George W. Bush put the achievement gap and the soft bigotry of low expectations indelibly onto the national education agenda with his No Child Left Behind Act, the next big event, of course, for the next Congress is how and when to reauthorize and alter it. Richard M. Nixon, of all people, was deploring the same thing, linking equity concerns to weak academic performance, decrying the education system's tendency to focus on inputs, and insisting that schools instead be judged on their results. He even demanded that the new National Institute of Education that he proposed, and this did come to pass a couple years later and is now the Institute for Education Sciences within the Department of Education, he even demanded that the National Institute of Education devise quote “New measures of educational output by which quote accountability could be assured.” And he went on at some length in this message about the importance of results-based accountability for teachers, principals, and schools.

He even tiptoed onto the treacherous terrain of national education standards. He never quite called for them, but this is what he said. "For years, the fear of national standards has been one of the bugaboos of education. The problem is that in opposing some mythical threat of national standards, what we have too often been doing is avoiding accountability for our own local performance. We have as a nation too long avoided thinking of the productivity of schools," unquote. Well, that's what today's education debates are all about. productivity of schools, national standards, results-based accountability. Now, I can't stand here and tell you that Nixon transformed American education policy. He was, in fact, way ahead of his time, and the transformation took decades, and it's fair to say we're still in the middle of it. But he rolled this ball forward, and that would not have happened had Pat Moynihan not placed it in his hand, explained what it was and why it mattered, and encouraged the president and his administration to give it a good, firm shove in the right direction. Thank you very much.

Steve Weissman: I would like to go to questions before long, but I wanted to toss a question at the panel, if the audience will indulge me, and see if we can mix it up a bit. One of the things that struck me in the letters is that Moynihan,

in later years after serving in the Nixon White House, wrote an interesting letter to Tony Lewis, Anthony Lewis of the "New York Times", saying that Nixon was more liberal than we supposed at the time, and that you think now. And he cited the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, and of course the Family Assistance Plan, and revenue sharing, and a number of other things.

But while he was at the White House, Pat Moynihan was struggling to also define what conservatism was, and wrote these very interesting memos saying that there was not anyone trying to pull together a conservative philosophy of government the way a liberal philosophy had been put together. And why can't we, instead of being opposed to programs, in the Nixon administration, embrace a philosophy of conservatism that is out there among many intellectuals, but they aren't welcome in the White House enough, and they aren't appreciated? And he wanted to bring coherence to what he saw as the conservatism of the administration. So, on the surface, these are two contradictory, yet again, contradictory impulses of Pat Moynihan. But I wonder if you could address this issue since we just come through another debate in an election where it seems fairly clear now what's conservative and what's liberal, but it didn't seem so clear back then, maybe. What do you think, Chris?

Chris DeMuth: The times were different in two respects. The first is that as far as liberalism was concerned, it was still in 1968 the case that civil rights issues were dominant in a way that's kind of difficult to recall. I mean, desegregation was just in the course of being dismantled. I mean, everybody in memory knew of segregated theaters and trains and public accommodations in the South. And the conservative, it's very crude, but the divide was often defined in those terms. John Price mentioned the "Ripon" society. John and I were "Ripponers", and we called ourselves liberal Republicans. John Mitchell called us juvenile delinquents.

If you go back and you look at what the Ripon Society was for, it's not liberal at all in modern terms. We were pro-civil rights libertarians. We were for the voluntary army, for the negative income tax. We were very much Milton Friedmanites, but revenue sharing. But the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Barry Goldwater's decision to vote against it was just defining of categories in very important ways. Liberalism was outflanked in those years by the emergence of real radicalism. Black power was displacing the moderate civil rights leaders. James Farmer, the founder of CORE, the engineer of the Freedom Rides in the South, was an assistant secretary in the Nixon administration. And the New Left and the Port Huron Statement was starting to, as Tom Wicker said, "Make liberals feel tired and old and out of shape."

Conservatism, for its part, "National Review" had been around for a decade and a half, but it was very much a cultural, its conservatism was quite cultural, and it

was quite libertarian. It did not have an affirmative philosophy of government. And what you see Pat struggling with is the birth of neoconservatism, which was a more practical form of conservatism. This was, in the old days, neoconservatism actually was about domestic policy. It came to have very different meanings in the Bush administration. But it was people who were serious about their, about liberal intentions to make the world a better place, but extraordinarily interested in practical questions of results. So it was a form of conservatism which actually grappled with difficult problems of government rather than simply opposing them all. So all of those things were to change. I think that today the fact that we have parties that are institutionally liberal and institutionally conservative affects our views of what those ideas consist of, not always in positive ways. The two doctrines are influenced, and I think in many ways, to the needs of the party to which they are now lock, stock, and barrel attached to.

Steve Weissman: You make an interesting point about race, too. John, did you want to talk next? But let me throw that into the mix. I mean, I felt in reading these letters and editing these letters a strange feeling, which was that the 70s were so toxic and full of racial anxiety that for all of the poisonous and acrimonious debate that we have today, we don't have that same kind of toxic politics. So maybe the overlay of race is what made, maybe it was an impediment to thinking through some of these philosophies. Does anyone want to comment on any of this?

Checker Finn: I'll just add, don't forget Vietnam. Just a few months after the 14th Street corridor was burning, the buses were surrounding the White House complex in order to keep the protesters from literally invading the White House. It was a very, very angry time.

Steve Weissman: Of course, Nixon's intervention or invasion of Cambodia in 1970 led to some resignations from his own staff. I mean, this discussion is primarily focused on the legacy of the domestic policies of that era. But, Steve, Vietnam and Cambodia really coursed through your office. You had some people resign. And Pat Moynihan was, as you said, he had supported Bobby Kennedy and then Hubert Humphrey. He was against the war. He advised Nixon not to make Johnson's war into Nixon's war. What was that like?

Steve Hess: The question of the students too, Kent State and so forth. Yeah, we were right in the midst of that, and there were some real demagogues in the administration, importantly, the Vice President of the United States. And I've never seen a letter such or two as you have in your volume where a staff member takes on the Vice President of the United States. So you have that as well. Certainly, it was very difficult because I went on to become the national chairman of the White House Conference on Children and then the White

House Conference on Youth. And how could we keep our youth involved? How could we be a government that wasn't excluding our young people? And there were plenty of young people on the White House staff who were making the same effort as well. But I must say there wasn't much support when some of the top were talking about these students as bums.

Steve Weissman: What about Nixon himself? We've been talking about him for the last bit, but he remains as confusing to me in some ways as ever. Do you, I mean, you made a very provocative statement saying Nixon was a tabula rasa. I, that kind of, I don't mean to exaggerate it because I'm sure you didn't really mean it in the way that I've exaggerated it, But He couldn't have been, obviously. No, no, no, Nixon. And so where does Nixon fit in? What did we learn about Nixon in all of these stories? John, you come next.

Steve Hess: No, no, no, Nixon. And so where... Let me just tell an anecdote about that for a moment, and then you'll see what a complicated person Richard Nixon was, a fascinating man. We'll be writing about him as long as people write about presidents. My daughter-in-law happened to be the casting director of Oliver Stone's movie on Nixon. And she asked if I would see Oliver Stone. And he called and said that he was coming to Washington. And I thought, well, that's very nice. I will put together four people who knew Nixon and he will put together four people. The four people that I had, in addition to myself, who had been a speechwriter for him and a biographer, were Len Garment, his law partner, Ron Ziegler, his press secretary, and John Sears, who had been an important political strategist for him. His people, by the way, were Anthony Hopkins, James Wood, the producer, and himself.

And about midway in this conversation, Anthony Hopkins who had said, "Call me Tony." I said, "Tony, note that here are four people who knew Nixon, thought they knew Nixon very well, and each person is describing somebody else, a different person from all the way through." Nixon, we're going to worry about that. We're going to worry about that as it becomes complicated when in fact Pat Moynihan was having his own problems of what he really wanted to be. He desperately wanted to keep the label liberal although it was far from where he was at the time. He rejected the neoconservative label that constantly comes through your things. And yet, in fact, they were his closest intellectual friends. So an awful lot of this was going on to a man who is, so put these things two together and wow, you have riddles within riddles.

Steve Weissman: A question from a distinguished member. Yeah, go ahead. There's a time for questions. Yeah. This has been... Nixon administration. Steve, you want to identify yourself first?

Bud Krogh: Yeah, go ahead. There's a time for questions. Yeah. Steve. Yes, I'm Bud Krogh, and I had the honor to be in the White House with all of these

gentlemen during that period of time, and I just want you to know that you've brought back some wonderful memories. Pat Moynihan played a huge role, I think, in the lives of many of us on the White House staff. And, Steve, I think you put in your book one incident that I'd like to tell right after the President's decision to invade Cambodia. We all know about what happened in Kent State. And I was having lunch over here at the Ritz Carlton at the time and a messenger came over with this information that four students had been shot. And it was just overwhelming.

And I ran back to the White House. First person I went to see was Pat, Pat Moynihan. And I said, this is what's happened, Pat. I know there's going to be some kind of statement that will have to be released about this. And he said, well, let me go to work on it. And some of you who worked with him know that he would wheel around and he'd start typing immediately. And he typed up this extraordinary statement that I think took into account what had happened. It was very compassionate, very direct. And I said, this is great. And I took it from him and I ran upstairs where they were working on a statement that was going to go out momentarily. And unfortunately, Pat didn't go with me. And I think, Steve, you point that out in the book that if he had followed me up there, we probably could have prevailed with a statement that was more reasonable, more fair, and correct at the time.

I also remember just with other staff people, Friday afternoons going to Pat's office about 5 o'clock and he'd open the bottom drawer and a certain liquid potion would come out. And he would begin to share ideas with us because he knew a lot of us were not only young, testosterone poisoned, as Chris pointed out, and maybe we needed some kind of help and counseling. And those Friday afternoons were wonderful. I've often thought that if Pat stayed on that staff over the next one to two years after he left, and some of us could have consulted with him at certain times in history, that history might have been different. I just want to thank you, Steve, for writing an excellent book and the four of you for what you've given us today. Thank you.

Steve Weissman: Thank you. John? Thank you. The book is great because I didn't write it. Pat wrote it.

John Price: Could I just make a comment on the question about who was Richard Nixon? Steve knew him well. I had a fascinating evening flight in the summer of 1969 out to San Clemente, and sitting next to me in the back of this small Air Force plane was the wife of Bob Finch, who was Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, but who had had a remarkable career. He'd been, I think, one of Nixon's assistants while he was Vice President. He'd been Lieutenant Governor of California. He was a very prominent, very strong figure in California moderate Republican politics. And I said to Mrs. Finch, I said,

“What is he like?” And she said, “John.” I said, “You know him. You and your husband, Bob, know him very well.” And she said, “John, we don't know him at all.” And they'd known him for 15, 18 years or so.

I think he was elusive, but I also loved seeing the lawyer in him. Because of these many Urban Affairs Council meetings, we would do a major job briefing. And then I saw, I felt Nixon in these meetings was as though he were hearing the oral arguments after reading the brief. And it was fascinating. I remember one time when we set up a dialogue, it had to do with the welfare reform, the head of the National Association of Businessmen at that time was Don Kendall, the president of Coca-Cola. And I had gone over and briefed him the night before on the welfare reform. And they got into a dialogue, he and perhaps it was Arthur Burns. And Nixon was watching as though it was a tennis ball being fired back and forth over the net by two good arguers. So I loved that side of him. There was obvious at times like that the intellectual eagerness of him, but very complex and just someone that was very hard to know, except through history. We'll figure it out.

Chris DeMuth: John, I think we're going to have to end on that as a concession to the shortness of life. We could go on for hours.

Male: I wonder if we could just ask Ben Watford to ask one question.

Chris DeMuth: Well, all right, Ben, and then, but we have a promise to cease Ben. So go ahead, Ben. Here you go.

Ben Watford: I haven't yet had the pleasure of reading Steve's book. I am writing a book called "Pat and Scoop" about Pat Moynihan and his reflection. Those of us who have been speechwriters have our own motto, which is that “Rhetoric yields reality.” And with Pat, we should not forget that. He had this great Irish gift of Blarney. And what he said, particularly at the time of the Zionism with racism thing, reverberated around the world. And the rhetoric thing, you know, when Reagan said “It was an evil empire, Mr. Gorbachev tear down this wall.” Natan Sharansky tells, excuse me, tells us of how this was telegraphed through the Gulag, and that these things, the words meant as much as the actions and the military power.

Steve Weissman: I want to thank everybody for a wonderful panel and again say how honored I am, Jeff.

Chris DeMuth: And thank all of you.